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I. INTRODUCTION
Organized crime has long wielded a powerful influence over le-
gitimate American business. Historically, organized crime in the
United States involved blatantly unlawful conduct such as syndi-
cated gambling, loan sharking, and trafficking in narcotics. More
recently, however, organized crime has found its roots in otherwise
lawful activity. In this way, organized crime may successfully en-
mesh itself in legitimate business and thus camouflage its true ac-
tivity and source of revenue. A hardware store funded by loan
sharking proceeds or a pizza parlor used as a place for prostitution
exemplifies the situations in which lawful and unlawful activity are
inexorably intertwined in an attempt to legitimize the unlawful
side of the business and thereby immunize it from civil or criminal
prosecution.
Congress has struggled for over four decades with its goal of
eradicating organized crime in America.1 This attempt to wipe out
organized crime stems from the adverse effects corrupt organiza-
tions have on legitimate competing enterprises.2 Recognizing that
organized crime is often associated with otherwise lawful activity,
1. Since the early 1950's, Congress has investigated the influence of organized crime on
legitimate American business. See infra notes 6, 7, 9 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 6 and accompanying text.
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Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO).3
By assembling a list of crimes and linking them as "predicate
acts"4 in a continuing criminal enterprise, Congress enabled a pros-
ecutor to destroy an otherwise lawful enterprise when the enter-
prise commits two predicate acts within a ten-year period. The fol-
lowing diagram illustrates the manner in which RICO renders an
enterprise a criminal enterprise:
TWO PREDICATE ACTS WITHIN TEN YEARS + ENTER-
PRISE (LAWFUL OR UNLAWFUL) = CRIMINAL ENTER-
PRISE (RICO VIOLATION)
As the equation demonstrates, the commission of at least two
predicate acts within a ten-year period renders the operation of the
enterprise unlawful. It is the use or the operation of the enterprise
to commit the predicate acts that is prohibited. Upon a finding
that at least two predicate acts are committed, the operation of the
enterprise constitutes criminal activity.
In the context of the hypothetical hardware store funded by
loan sharking proceeds, the illicit funding of the store constitutes
the requisite predicate acts, rendering the operation of the hard-
ware store unlawful under RICO substantive provisions. In the
case of the pizza parlor used as a place for prostitution, the com-
mission of at least two acts of prostitution constitutes the requisite
predicate acts. As with the hardware store, the operation of the
pizza parlor constitutes criminal activity under RICO substantive
provisions.
The paradigmatic situation arises in the application of RICO
substantive provisions to the case of a bookstore engaged in the
sale of both obscene and nonobscene material. As the above dia-
gram illustrates, under the statute, the commission of at least two
predicate acts within a ten-year period renders the operation of the
enterprise unlawful. In the context of a bookstore, the sale of at
least two obscene materials within a ten-year period constitutes
the requisite predicate acts in an alleged RICO violation. Upon a
finding that obscene materials have been sold on the premises at
least twice, the use or the operation of the bookstore constitutes
criminal activity. Under RICO substantive provisions, not only the
sale of obscene materials (the predicate offense) but the sale of
3. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970)(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (1988)).
4. For a discussion of predicate acts, see infra notes 17, 18 and accompanying text.
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nonobscene materials becomes unlawful.
The application of RICO substantive provisions to a bookstore
engaged in the sale of both obscene and nonobscene materials
raises First Amendment considerations. Obscene materials are not
protected by the First Amendment. Materials not deemed to be
legally obscene, however, are entitled to the same protection as
other forms of expression.' The application of RICO substantive
provisions to a bookstore in which both obscene and nonobscene
materials are sold differs from that of a hardware store funded by
loan sharking proceeds or a pizza parlor which is used as a place
for prostitution in the activity prohibited under the statute.
In the context of a hardware store, the conduct prohibited is
the operation of the hardware store and the incident sale of mater-
ials. Operating the hardware store involves nonexpressive activity,
beyond the scope of the First Amendment. The same is true of the
pizza parlor. That is, the conduct that is rendered criminal, the
operation of the pizza parlor, does not constitute the type of activ-
ity protected under the First Amendment. A fundamental differ-
ence, however, arises in the context of the hypothetical bookstore.
The prohibited conduct under the statute in this case is the sale of
presumptively protected material and therefore requires an analy-
sis under the appropriate First Amendment standard of review.
The application of RICO substantive provisions to a bookstore
engaged in the sale of both obscene and nonobscene material raises
the question whether Congress can render this enterprise a crimi-
nal enterprise. In contrast to the hardware store funded by loan
sharking proceeds or the pizza parlor used as a place for prostitu-
tion, the sale of presumptively protected reading or viewing mate-
rial invokes First Amendment scrutiny. This Article will examine
the constitutionality of the prohibited conduct under RICO sub-
stantive provisions in the context of the hypothetical bookstore en-
gaged in the sale of obscene and nonobscene material.
II. RACKETEERING INFLUENCED & CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT
A. Historical Perspective
In the early 1950's, Congress began investigating organized
criminal activity, such as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, and
narcotics trafficking,6 and the influence that activity had on the
5. See infra text accompanying notes 34-37.
6. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922
(Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose)(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988)),
1992]
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nation's economic system and its interference with legitimate busi-
ness.' Because of these investigations, Congress enacted the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act (OCCA) of 1970.8 Recognizing that tradi-
tional law enforcement methods failed to eradicate organized
crime's infiltration of legitimate American business,9 Congress sub-
sequently enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act as Title IX of OCCA. l0
B. Purpose
The purpose of RICO is to destroy organized crime "by pro-
viding enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the un-
lawful activities of those engaged in organized crime."" It is
designed to provide new legal tools of unprecedented scope for an
Section 1 of the Act provides:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions
of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of
force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its
power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gam-
bling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and dis-
tribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social ex-
ploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and
corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our
democratic process; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken
the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and com-
peting organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate
and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the gen-
eral welfare of the Nation and its citizens ....
7. See The President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967); The President's Comm'n Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report on Organized Crime (1967). See
generally, John L. Koenig, Comment, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme
Court Takes the Racketeering Requirement Out of Racketeering, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 821,
822 (1986). See SPECIAL COMM. To INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE,
THIRD INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1951)(imploring Congress
to adopt measures to counter organized crime); SPECIAL COMM. To INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED
CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, SECOND INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1951)(finding that organized crime operates through interstate commerce and influ-
ences local authorities in many states). Presidential commissions and congressional commit-
tees further reported on the influence of organized crime in the United States.
8. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970)(Congressional Statement of Findings
and Purpose)(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988)).
9. See, e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 105, 1st Cong., ist Sess. (1969)(President of the United
States stating in a message to Congress that two decades of federal effort against organized
crime had not succeeded in eradicating any of the "families" that controlled the criminal
syndicates).
10. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970)(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (1988)).
11. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970).
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assault upon organized crime and its economic roots. 2 Ironically,
Congress could not adequately define organized crime in the stat-
ute.'" As a result, RICO makes the person's conduct the subject of
its prohibitions. As opposed to criminalizing membership in crimi-
nal organizations, RICO defines the conduct commonly associated
with organized crime and makes such conduct a violation.'4
RICO substantive provisions, for example, make it "unlawful
for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise en-
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the con-
duct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt."' 5 RICO thus prohibits in-
vesting in, controlling, or conducting any enterprise through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity or through money derived from a pat-
tern of racketeering activity.' 6
The federal statute defines a pattern of racketeering activity
as the commission of at least two "acts of racketeering activity"
within a ten-year period. 7 These acts, referred to as "predicate
acts," are any crime listed in section 1961 and defined as "racke-
teering activity."' 8
C. Conduct Prohibited by RICO Section 1962 of the Federal
Act
Specifically, RICO prohibits four activities: 19 (1) using or in-
vesting, directly or indirectly, of any income derived from a pat-
12. Id. at 923.
13. 116 CONG. REC. 18,912, 18,913 (1970)(statement of Sen. McClellan); see id. at
35,204 (statement of Rep. Poff)(organized crime impossible to define). Legislative history
indicates that the failure of Congress to define organized crime stemmed from its desire to
eradicate organized and systemic criminal activity, not occasional acts of criminal conduct.
Id. at 32,205.
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (a)-(c)(1988).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)(1988).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (a)-(c)(1988).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)(1988). Legislative history indicates that Congress intended
"pattern" to mean connected and periodic, not separate and erratic. S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969)(stating that "[o]ne isolated 'racketeering activity' was thought
insufficient to trigger the remedies under the proposed chapter" and that "the target of [the
legislation] is thus not sporadic activity"). The United States Supreme Court's decision in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479 (1985), however, held that the government need
only allege two violations of prohibited predicate acts; it need not be satisfied by two prior
convictions of predicate acts. Id. at 488-89.
18. Prohibited "racketeering activities" include murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson,
robbery, bribery extortion, and dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs. 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1)(A) (1988).
19. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)-(d)(1988).
1992]
5
McGovern: Obscenity Predicates, RICO, and the First Amendment
Published by Institutional Repository, 1992
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
tern of racketeering activity through collection of unlawful debt to
acquire any interest in, or to establish or operate any enterprise
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce;2" (2) acquiring or main-
taining, directly or indirectly, of any interest in or control of any
enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce through a
pattern of racketeering activity, or through collection of an unlaw-
ful debt;2 (3) conducting or participating in the affairs of any en-
terprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity or through collection of unlawful
debt;22 and (4) conspiring to violate any of the aforementioned
provisions.23
D. RICO Substantive Provisions Under Section 1962
Under the statute, the use of an enterprise to commit at least
two predicate acts can render the "operation" of the "enterprise"
unlawful. 24 It is the use of the enterprise to commit the racketeer-
ing act that is prohibited. 5 Upon a finding that the enterprise
committed at least two predicate acts, RICO substantive provi-
sions render the enterprise a criminal enterprise and the operation
of the enterprise, because it is determined to be criminal, criminal
activity.26 Otherwise lawful acts of the enterprise, whether they are
predominant or merely incidental to the business, become part of
the enterprise and also constitute criminal activity.27 In the con-
text of a hardware store funded by loan sharking proceeds, for ex-
ample, the operation of the hardware store, whether or not it is the
predominant activity of the enterprise, constitutes criminal
activity.
Similarly, in the case of a bookstore engaged in the sale of
both obscene and nonobscene material, whether the primary func-
tion of the store is the sale of nonobscene material is irrelevant
under the statute. The sale of two or more pieces of obscene mate-
rial on the premises within a ten-year period nevertheless renders
the operation of the bookstore criminal activity.
20. See Id. at § 1962(a).
21. Id. at § 1962(b).
22. Id. at § 1962(c).
23. Id. at § 1962(d).
24. See supra text accompanying notes 15, 19-23.
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)(1988). See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
26. See supra text accompanying note 15.
27. See supra text accompanying note 16.
[Vol. 9:301
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E. RICO Punishment Power Under Section 1963
RICO provides both criminal penalties28 and civil remedies 29
for violation of its substantive provisions. One of the most impor-
tant of the remedies and penalties available to prosecutors is the
forfeiture of assets acquired through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity.30 Thus, as part of the criminal penalties, RICO forfeiture
provisions allow for the separation of the defendant from the crim-
inal enterprise and the permanent closure of that enterprise.
F. Expansion of Predicate Acts to Include Obscenity
Violations
Initially, the federal statute did not contain the predicate of-
fense of obscenity violations. In an attempt to combat the dissemi-
nation of obscene books and materials,3 1 Congress amended the
28. Section 1963(a) provides: "Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this
chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years (or for life if the
violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life
imprisonment), or both . . " 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (Supp. 1990).
29. Civil remedies include awarding treble damages to persons with business or prop-
erty injuries that arise out of a RICO violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(1988).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (a)(1988 & Supp. 1990). Section 1963 (d) provides district courts
with jurisdiction to enter restraining orders pursuant to Section 1963(a) actions. Section
1963(e) authorizes the Attorney General to seize property forfeited under this section. It
requires forfeiture of:
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section
1962;
(2) any -
(A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of
influence over; any enterprise which the person has established, oper-
ated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of in vio-
lation of Section 1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt col-
lection in violation of Section 1962.
The court, in imposing sentence on such person shall order, in addition to any other
sentence imposed pursuant to this section, that the person forfeit to the United States all
property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by this section, a
defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from an offense may be fined not more than
twice the gross profits or other proceeds. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1)-(3)(1988 & Supp. 1990). See
also United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 104-05 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1052 (1985)(holding forfeiture mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) after finding that ap-
pellant's property was used to promote racketeering).
31. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020, 98 Stat. 1837, 2143 (1984)(codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1)(1990))(obscenity crimes added to definition of racketeering activity after research
indicated that organized crime syndicates were involved in pornography trade).
1992]
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statute to include as a predicate offense, "any act . . . involving
. . . dealing in obscene matter. . . which is chargeable under State
law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year...
*"32 Congress based this expansion on the arguable connection be-
tween pornography and organized crime.33
"Obscenity is not a synonym for pornography." 34 Pornography
refers generally to sexually explicit material and should be distin-
guished from obscenity, which is a legal term of art that refers to
materials not protected by the First Amendment because they fall
within the guidelines established by the Supreme Court's decision
in Miller v. California.5 Legally obscene materials, therefore, may
be regulated or banned by state and federal government.36 Unlike
obscenity, however, sexually explicit materials are entitled to the
same protection as other forms of expression.3s
Perhaps ironically, however, obscene materials are often sold
by an enterprise engaged in the sale of presumptively protected
First Amendment materials.3 8 The use of RICO substantive provi-
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)(1990). In 1984, Congress extended the list of predicate acts
under RICO to include violations of both federal obscenity code and generic state provisions
prohibiting "dealing in obscene matter." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1990).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(1988 & Supp. 1990). In proposing the inclusion of state and
federal obscenity violations as predicate offenses under the federal RICO statute, Senator
Helms stated:
We are experiencing an explosion in the volume and availability of pornography
in our society. Today it is almost impossible to open mail, turn on the television,
or walk in the downtown areas of our cities, or even in some suburban areas,
without being accosted by pornographic materials. The sheer volume and perva-
siveness of pornography of our society tends to make adults less sensitive to the
traditional value of chaste conduct and leads children to abandon the moral val-
ues their parents have tried so hard to instill in them.
130 CONG. REC. 5433 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1984)(statement of Sen. Helms).
34. ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 9 (1981). Obscenity is a
legal term of art that refers to indecency and filth. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the
First Amendment, 1986 DuKE L.J. 589, 595. For the Supreme Court's current definition of
obscenity, see infra text accompanying notes 76-79. Pornography, on the other hand, refers
generally to sexually explicit adult material that depicts women as prostitutes and focuses
on the role of women in providing sexual pleasure to men. Sunstein, supra, at 595.
35. 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
36. See John J. O'Donnell, RICO Forfeiture and Obscenity: Prior Restraint or Subse-
quent Punishment?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101 (1988)(citing Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973)).
37. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957)(free speech and press clauses
of the First Amendment protect sexually explicit materials but exclude materials deemed to
be legally obscene).
38. This constitutional quagmire may in fact further the government's interests. In
1988, for example, the Justice Department stated that it planned to seek more racketeering
indictments in order to close down major distributors of pornography. See Philip Shenon,
Justice Dept. Plans Anti-Racketeering Drive Against Pornography, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
1988, at A16. See also O'Donnell, supra note 36, at 1101-02.
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sions to combat obscenity implicates constitutional considerations
of freedom of speech and the press under the First Amendment.
RICO substantive provisions must therefore be examined for their
operation and effect on nonobscene materials.
G. Application of RICO Substantive Provisions Using Ob-
scenity Predicates to an Enterprise Selling Presumptively Pro-
tected First Amendment Material
Congress' expansion of predicate offenses to include the dis-
semination of obscene material as applied to an enterprise engaged
in the sale of both obscene and nonobscene material raises serious
constitutional issues. RICO substantive provisions render an enter-
prise selling obscene materials a criminal enterprise,39 and the con-
tinued operation of that enterprise when obscene materials have
been sold at least twice on the premises, constitutes criminal
activity.4 °
In the context of a bookstore, therefore, RICO substantive
provisions using obscenity predicates render the bookstore itself a
criminal enterprise over and above such criminal prosecutions as
may arise from the actual sale of obscene materials. Consequently,
the operation of the bookstore constitutes criminal activity; the
sale of obscene material and nonobscene material both constitute
part of the criminal enterprise. The owner or operator of the enter-
prise is ultimately punished under the statute not only for the
commission of the predicate offense - dissemination of obscene
material - but for the operation of an enterprise which is engaged
in the sale of material protected by the First Amendment.
This result leads to the question of whether Congress can con-
stitutionally render an enterprise engaged in the sale of presump-
tively protected reading or viewing material a criminal enterprise.
If Congress cannot enact laws that result in the prohibition of an
enterprise selling nonobscene material, the expansion of the predi-
cate offenses to include dealing in obscene matter as applied to an
otherwise lawful enterprise selling constitutionally protected mate-
rial poses grave constitutional consequences.
It is the prohibited operation of an enterprise selling nonob-
scene material under RICO substantive provisions that triggers
First Amendment scrutiny. This Comment examines the applica-
tion of RICO substantive provisions to an enterprise selling both
39. See supra text accompanying notes 15-23.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
1992]
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obscene and nonobscene material. It concludes that this applica-
tion under the statute violates the First Amendment.
III. SPEECH PROTECTED AND UNPROTECTED UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
A. Constitutional Standard
The First Amendment prohibits the enactment or application
of any law "abridging the freedom of speech.""' The social impor-
tance of the protection given speech and the press is long recog-
nized. "The fundamental freedoms of speech and press have con-
tributed greatly to the development and well-being of our free
society and are indispensable to its continued growth. Ceaseless
vigilance is the watchword to prevent their erosion by Congress
and by the States."' 2
While the First Amendment protects sexually explicit materi-
als but excludes materials found to be legally obscene,43 the bound-
ary between materials that are legally obscene and those that are
sexually explicit but protected by the Constitution remains uncer-
tain. Despite the difficulty in defining obscenity, the federal gov-
ernment has utilized several methods in an attempt to eradicate
obscenity. These methods include criminal laws punishing the sale
and distribution of obscene materials, civil injunctive proceed-
44 44ings, nuisance abatement laws,' 5 and zoning laws.'6 Since Con-
gress' expansion of the predicate offenses to include obscenity vio-
lations, the far-reaching remedies under RICO punishment
provisions have made it the preferred method of both state47 and
41. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I. First
amendment protection of freedom of expression is applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
42. Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 4 Elliot's Debates 571 (1941).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
44. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1973).
45. See, e.g., Note, Enjoining Obscenity as a Public Nuisance and The Prior Re-
straint Doctrine, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1616, 1617-20 (1984).
46. For an extensive discussion of the First Amendment issue raised by the use of
zoning regulations to regulate adult establishments, see generally Recent Developments,
The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Ordinances Regulating Adult Establish-
ments, 30 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 315, 328-29 (1986)(Zoning laws must strictly
adhere to requirements that protect First Amendment right.).
47. Federal RICO attempts to prevent organized crime in enterprises dealing with in-
terstate and international business. State RICO focuses on intrastate organized crime. Most
state statutes are nevertheless technically modeled after federal RICO. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1988). See also Alvers v. State of Indiana, 489 N.E.2d 83, 87 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986).
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federal legislatures to eliminate obscenity.48
B. Overview of First Amendment Jurisprudence
First Amendment jurisprudence indicates that issues involving
presumptively protected materials must be decided under carefully
defined parameters with the highest regard for the constitutional
consequences on protected speech.49 In Near v. Minnesota,50 for
instance, a newspaper owner challenged the constitutionality of a
Minnesota statute5' that authorized injunction in restraint of pub-
lication of a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper,
magazine, or other periodical.5 2
Under the statute, the publisher was permitted to show in de-
fense that the matter published was true and published "with good
motives and for justifiable ends. '5 3 The Supreme Court held the
statute, "so far as it authorized the [injunction] proceedings. . . to
be an infringement of the liberty of the press guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment," regardless of the question of the truth of
the charges contained in the particular periodical. 4
The Near Court noted that one of the purposes of the statute
was not punishment in the ordinary sense, but suppression of the
offending newspaper or periodical. The reason for the enactment is
that prosecutions to enforce penal statutes for libel do not result in
"efficient repression or suppression of the evils of scandal. '55 It is
the continued publication of scandalous and defamatory matter,
the Court concluded, that constitutes the business and the de-
clared nuisance.5 6
48. Legislative history reveals that Congress intended RICO to be the preferred
weapon of prosecutofs to undermine criminal enterprises. See 116 CONG. REc. 591
(1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan) (stating that RICO focuses on organizations because in-
dividual prosecutions are inadequate methods of combatting organized crime); 115 CONG.
REC. 9567 (1969)(statement of Sen. McClellan)("Constant references have been made to the
frustration resulting when the only consequence of conviction is that organized crime and its
infiltrated organizations are run by a new leader and the organizations which are the real
threat are not affected.").
49. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). But see United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968)(holding that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms).
50. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
51. MINN. STAT., ch. 285 § 1(b)(1925).
52. Near, 283 U.S. at 702.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 722-23.
55. Id. at 711.
56. Id.
19921
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The Court rejected the State's attempt to justify the statute as
dealing not with publication per se, but with the business of pub-
lishing defamation. "Characterizing the publication as a business,
and the business as a nuisance, does not permit an invasion of the
constitutional immunity against restraint. '57 The Near Court
found that the suppression was accomplished under the statute by
enjoining the publication and that restraint was the object of the
statute."
The Court held that the operation and effect of the statute in
substance was that unless the owner or publisher was able and dis-
posed to bring competent evidence to satisfy the judge that the
charges were true and published with good motives and for justifia-
ble ends, his newspaper or periodical was suppressed and further
publication was made punishable as a contempt. This, the Court
held, was the essence of censorship.59
While the Court recognized that the freedom of speech and
press clause is not absolute, 0 it emphasized that limitations to
First Amendment protection have been acknowledged only in ex-
ceptional cases.61 The Court stressed the possible deleterious con-
sequences of upholding the statute in Near:
If such a statute, authorizing suppression and injunction on such
a basis, is constitutionally valid, it would be equally permissible
for the legislature to provide that at any time the publisher of
any newspaper could be brought before a court, . . .and re-
quired to produce proof of the truth of his publication, or of
what he intended to publish, and of his motives, or stand en-
joined. If this can be done, the legislature may provide machin-
ery for determining in the complete exercise of its discretion
what are justifiable ends and restrain publication accordingly.
And it would be but a step to a complete system of censorship. 2
Similarly, the application of RICO section 1962 to a bookstore
prohibits the operation of the bookstore and consequently the sale
of First Amendment material when two obscene materials are sold
57. Id. at 720.
58. Id. at 712.
59. Id. at 713.
60. Id. at 716.
61. In Near, the Court acknowledged limitations to the protections of the First
Amendment in exceptional cases: "When a nation is at war many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its efforts that their utterance will not be endured
so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right." Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
62. Id. at 721.
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on the premises within a ten year period. Bookstore owners, like
newspapers, are distributors of protected speech. By rendering the
enterprise engaged in the sale of two or more obscene materials
criminal, the otherwise lawful activity of selling books becomes
unlawful.
Applying the Court's rationale in Near,6" it is the use and op-
eration of the bookstore to sell obscene materials that constitutes
the prohibited activity. The effect of the substantive offense is to
prohibit the bookstore owner or operator's First Amendment right
in selling nonobscene materials.
The effects of the RICO substantive provision are far broader
than the effect of the Minnesota statute at issue in Near. Unlike
the statutory violations in Near, RICO violations render the book-
store a criminal enterprise, regardless of a showing that the ob-
scene materials are no longer sold on the premises, or how few ob-
scene materials were sold. Congress' expansion of predicate acts to
include "dealing in obscene matter" becomes the legislative "ma-
chinery" alluded to by the Near Court, prohibiting the operation
of the bookstore when two obscene materials are sold on the
premises.
The Near Court reasoned that "[i]f, however, the publisher
has a constitutional right to publish, without prior restraint, an
edition of his newspaper charging official derelictions, it cannot be
denied that he may publish subsequent editions for the same pur-
pose. He does not lose his right by exercising it."' 64 Similarly, con-
trary to the application of RICO substantive provisions to a book-
store owner or operator, if such an owner or operator has a right to
sell nonobscene material, he may not "lose [this] right by exercis-
ing it." 65 An examination of First Amendment jurisprudence con-
cerning the question whether a bookstore in fact has such a right
follows.
The Supreme Court established modern precedent for the per-
missible scope of government regulation of sexually explicit mater-
ials in Roth v. United States.6 In Roth, the Court considered
whether a federal obscenity statute 7 that prohibits the mailing of
63. For a recent application of the Court's rationale in Near, see City of Paducah v.
Investment Entertainment, 791 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1986). See also infra text accompanying
notes 159-161.
64. Near, 283 U.S. at 720.
65. Id.
66. 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)(Court first addressed the constitutionality of a criminal
obscenity statute).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1991). The statute provided, in pertinent part: "Every obscene,
1992]
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obscene material violates the First Amendment. The dispositive
question, the Court concluded, was "whether obscenity is utterance
within the area of protected speech and press." 8 Under carefully
defined parameters, the Court held that obscenity is not protected
by the First Amendment. The Court recognized, however, the im-
portance in safeguarding First Amendment protection for nonob-
scene materials:
The fundamental freedoms of speech and press have contrib-
uted greatly to the development and well-being of our free soci-
ety and are indispensable to its continued growth. Ceaseless vig-
ilance is the watchword to prevent their erosion by Congress or
by the States . . . . It is therefore vital that the standards for
judging obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom of speech
and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner ap-
pealing to prurient interests.6 9
Under Roth, the standard for judging obscenity adequate to
withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity, is whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interests. 70 The standard set out in Roth stemmed from
the notion that "all ideas having even the slightest redeeming so-
cial importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full
protection of the guarantees, unless excludable because they en-
croach upon the limited area of more important interests."'1
The Supreme Court revised the Roth test in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts72 to include three elements. First, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient inter-
est in sex. 73 Second, "the material is patently offensive because it
affronts contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters. '7 4 Lastly, "the ma-
terial is utterly without redeeming social value. 7 5
Since Roth, the Supreme Court has held that there is a pre-
lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other pub-
lication of an indecent character; . . .[i]s declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not
be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier." Id.
68. Roth, 354 U.S. at 481.
69. Id. at 488.
70. Id. at 489.
71. Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
72. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
73. Id. at 418.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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sumption that sexually explicit material, however unappealing it
may be, is protected by the First Amendment. "6 Sixteen years after
the decision in Roth, the Supreme Court in Miller v. California"
again redefined the constitutional boundaries on government regu-
lation of sexually explicit materials. "[S]tatutes designed to regu-
late obscene materials must be carefully limited. As a result, we
now confine the permissible scope of such [government] regulation
to works which depict or describe sexual conduct [and which meet
the following three-part test]. 178 The Supreme Court rejected the
definition of obscenity as expressed in Memoirs and delineated in-
stead the following three-part test:
(a) Whether the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, ap-
peals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.79
Miller remains the prevailing constitutional standard when assess-
ing whether material is obscene.
C. The effect of RICO Substantive Provisions Using Obscen-
ity Predicates on Protected Speech
The Supreme Court's decisions from Roth to Miller exclude
obscenity from First Amendment scrutiny and establish an argua-
bly ascertainable standard by which to judge a work obscene. First
Amendment jurisprudence establishes, however, that valid laws
regulating obscenity may not ignore constitutional safeguards
designed to prohibit the suppression of presumptively protected
speech.
Historically, restrictions on speech have been examined for
prior restraint violations. A prior restraint in speech suppresses an
act or an expression before it enters the market place. 0 There are
two types of prior restraints: 1) a court injunction that prevents a
76. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
77. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
78. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24.
79. Id. at 24-25.
80. See Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66
MINN. L. REv. 11 (1980).
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person from engaging in certain types of communication,81 and 2)
restraints that require a license before one may engage in a partic-
ular form of expression.8 2
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that rigorous proce-
dural safeguards must be employed before expressive materials can
be seized as "obscene." 8 The Court first examined the application
of "prior restraint" on sexually explicit materials in Marcus v.
Search Warrant,84 wherein the Court invalidated confiscation of
expressive materials seized pursuant to a valid search warrant but
without an adversarial hearing on the question of obscenity.
In Marcus, under proceedings pursuant to certain Missouri
statutes, 5 a city police officer filed a sworn complaint that each of
the appellants, a wholesale distributor of magazines, newspapers,
and books, and the operators of five retail newsstands, kept "ob-
scene" publications for sale. 6 In an ex parte proceeding, without
granting appellants a hearing or even seizing any of the publica-
tions in question, the trial judge issued search warrants authorizing
the officers to search appellants' premises and "seize" all "ob-
scene" material.87
The officers seized all copies of any publications which in their
judgment were obscene. Appellants moved to quash the search
warrants for return of the seized publications and for suppression
of their use in evidence, on the ground that their seizure violated
the protection of free speech and press clause guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 8 The trial court denied appellants' mo-
tions. The trial court found that 100 of the seized publications
were obscene and ordered their destruction. The court also found
that 180 were not obscene and ordered their return. The state su-
preme court sustained the validity of these orders.8 9
The United States Supreme Court held that the search and
seizure procedures lacked sufficient safeguards to protect nonob-
scene materials and reversed the judgment.9 0 "A state is not free to
adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity
without regard to the possible consequences for constitutionally
81. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 702-03 (1931).
82. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 52 n.1 (1965).
83. Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 62 (1989).
84. 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
85. Mo. REV. STAT. § 542.380 et. seq. (1955)(repealed 1974).
86. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961).
87. Id. at 722.
88. Id. at 723.
89. Id. at 721.
90. Id. at 731.
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protected speech."91
Similar to Marcus, the Supreme Court in A Quantity of Books
v. Kansas,92 invalidated the confiscation of books and films when
copies of selected books were seized without a prior adversarial
hearing on their obscenity.93 In these cases and those immediately
following, the Court established that pretrial seizures of expressive
materials could only be undertaken pursuant to procedures
"designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity. '94
This may be accomplished by utilizing the least restrictive meth-
ods which would infringe upon protected speech. The forfeiture of
obscene materials, for instance, and fines imposed on the owner or
operator of the bookstore, would ensure First Amendment protec-
tion of presumptively protected speech.
The Court later refined that approach. Most importantly, in
Heller v. New York,95 the Court noted that "seizing films to de-
stroy them or to block their distribution or exhibition is a very
different matter from seizing a single copy of a film for the bona
fide purpose of preserving it as evidence in a criminal
proceeding.'96
Thus, while a single copy of a book or film may be seized and
retained for evidentiary purposes based on a finding of probable
cause, the publication may not be taken out of circulation com-
pletely until there has been a determination of obscenity after an
adversarial hearing.9 7 The Supreme Court in Freedman v. Mary-
land98 delineated the minimum due process owed to individuals
91. Id. at 730-31. The Marcus Court noted the state's limited power to suppress ob-
scenity given the constitutional protections for free expression:
We therefore held that a State may not impose absolute criminal liability on a
bookseller for the possession of obscene material, even if it may dispense with
the element of scienter in dealing with such evils as impure food and drugs ...
There is no specific constitutional inhibition against making the distributors of
food the strictest censors of their merchandise, but the constitutional guarantees
of the freedom of speech and of the press stand in the way of imposing a similar
requirement on the bookseller.
Id. (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-153 (1959)).
92. 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
93. Id. at 208.
94. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961).
95. 413 U.S. 483 (1973).
96. Id. at 492 (emphasis in the original).
97. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 874-876 (1986).
98. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). In Freedman, the defendant was convicted of exhibiting a mo-
tion picture without submitting it to the Maryland State Board of Censors for prior ap-
proval. The defendant appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the Maryland motion
picture censorship statute. Id. at 52. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 66A, § 2, (1957) provides, in
pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful to sell, lease, lend, exhibit or use any motion picture
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deprived of expressive materials prior to a judgment:
First, once the censor disapproves the film, the exhibitor must
assume the burden of instituting judicial proceedings and of per-
suading the courts that the film is protected expression. Second,
once the Board has acted against a film, exhibition is prohibited
pending judicial review, however protracted .. . .Third, it is
abundantly clear that the Maryland statute provides no assur-
ance of prompt judicial determination. 9
While the general rule under the Fourth Amendment is that
any and all contraband, instrumentalities, and evidence of crimes
may be seized on probable cause (and even without a warrant in
various circumstances), it is otherwise when materials presump-
tively protected are involved.'00 The Supreme Court therefore has
recognized that certain activities of commercial distribution are
presumptively protected under the doctrine of prior restraint. Not-
withstanding this recognition, however, the Court has held that the
First Amendment does not preclude closure of a bookstore when it
engages in criminal conduct not protected by the First
Amendment.
In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,10 the defendants operated an
adult bookstore that sold sexually explicit publications and had
booths available for viewing sexually explicit movies. 02 In addition
to the sale of sexually explicit materials, illicit solicitation of pros-
titution occurred on the premises. 03 A New York statute author-
ized the closure of a building found to be a public health nuisance
if the building was used as a place for prostitution and lewdness. 04
The statute did not provide for the seizure of the contents of the
building.10 5 The defendants argued that closing the bookstore in-
terfered with their First Amendment rights to sell nonobscene
books on the premises. 06
film or view in the State of Maryland unless the said film or view has been submitted by the
exchange owner or lessee of the film or view and duly approved and licensed by the Mary-
land State Board of Censors."
Freedman, 380 U.S. at 52 n.1. The defendant argued that the statute was an invalid prior
restraint because the censorship board could ban a film without a prompt judicial review.
The Court concluded that the Maryland procedural scheme did not satisfy these criteria.
99. 380 U.S. at 59-60.
100. Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 US 319, 326 n. 5 (1979).
101. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
102. Id. at 698.
103. Id. at 698-99.
104. Id. at 699-700 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2320, 2329 (McKinney 1985)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 700.
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The Supreme Court upheld the statute, finding that the fac-
tual situation in Arcara did not trigger application of the First
Amendment.10 7 The Arcara court reasoned that the sexual activity
that occurred on the bookstore premises involved nonexpressive
activity, beyond the scope of First Amendment protection. The
Court held that the First Amendment did not bar closure of the
bookstore, because the sale of books in an establishment that was
used for prostitution does not confer First Amendment coverage to
defeat a valid statute which is aimed at terminating illegal uses of
premises." 8
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor noted the difference
between a bookstore where prostitution occurred and a bookstore
selling obscene books: "If. . . a city were to use a nuisance statute
as a pretext for closing down a bookstore because it sold indecent
books. . the case would clearly implicate First Amendment con-
cerns and require analysis under the appropriate First Amendment
standard of review."' 0 9
The First Amendment standard of review should not be ap-
plied, Justice O'Connor reasoned, where, as here, the government
is regulating neither speech nor an incidental nonexpressive effect
of speech. The hypothetical hardware store funded by loan shark-
ing proceeds, and the pizza parlor used as a place for prostitution,
fall within Justice O'Connor's rationale: the activities involved con-
stitute neither speech nor an incidental nonexpressive effect of
speech. Justice O'Connor illustrates, however, how the analysis dif-
fers in the context of a bookstore engaged in the sale of both ob-
scene and nonobscene material. This case, Justice O'Connor ex-
plains, would require First Amendment analysis.
The prophecy of Justice O'Connor's words in Arcara come to
fruition when RICO substantive provisions using obscenity predi-
cates are applied to a bookstore engaged in selling presumptively
protected material. Unlike the solicitation of prostitution, the sale
of books "implicate First Amendment concerns and requires analy-
sis under the appropriate First Amendment standard of review. ' ' °
First Amendment jurisprudence indicates that a sanction against
an adult bookstore that suppresses protected speech, as well as un-
protected obscenity, acts as a prior restraint and violates the book-
107. Id. at 707.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 708 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stevens joined in the concurring
opinion.
110. Id.
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store owner's First Amendment rights."'
More recently, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of a federal criminal statute that prohibited the sale of both
obscene and nonobscene, although "sexually explicit" or indecent
telephone messages. In Sable Communications of California v.
FCC," 2 the Court upheld the criminal prohibition against obscene
messages but struck down the ban on nonobscene messages."' The
Court observed: "Sexual expression which is indecent but not ob-
scene is protected by the First Amendment; and the [government]
do [es] not submit that the sale of such materials to adults could be
criminalized solely because they are indecent.""1
4
While the Supreme Court has held that the standards gov-
erning regulation of allegedly obscene books and materials should
not differ from those applied with respect to narcotics, gambling,
and other contraband, the Court has emphasized that an order is-
sued in the area of First Amendment rights must be framed in the
narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective
permitted by the constitutional mandate. These terms must also
meet the essential needs of the public order. 15 This Comment sug-
gests that in order to pass constitutional scrutiny, the objective is
best accomplished through narrowly-drawn procedures that do not
interfere with the continued sale of presumptively protected
materials." 6
D. Analysis of RICO's Effect on Protected Speech
The prohibited activity under RICO substantive provisions
must be examined against the backdrop of the foregoing First
Amendment jurisprudence. A conviction for a violation of section
1962(a) requires proof that the accused (1) conducted (2) an enter-
prise (3) affecting interstate commerce (4) through a pattern (5) of
111. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
112. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
113. Id. at 117.
114. Id. at 126.
115. Id. The Sable Court emphasized that while the government may regulate the con-
tent of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest, it must
choose the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest. See also Carroll v.
President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968)(Court struck down
a ten day restraining order, issued ex parte and without notice to petitioners, against a rally
organized by a white supremacist group).
116. See, e.g., State v. Feld, 745 P.2d 146, 153-154 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)("While the
court could constrain a defendant from moving inventory in its entirety, it could not inter-
fere with continued exhibitions or sales").
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racketeering activity.117
In the context of Justice O'Connor's metaphorical bookstore in
Arcara,118 the activity prohibited by section 1962 is the use of the
bookstore to sell obscene materials. Under the federal statute,
therefore, the sale of two or more obsence materials by a book-
store's owners or operators constitutes the requisite predicate acts
on which the criminal racketeering activity is based.
Under section 1962(c), a determination that the materials sold
are obscene renders the bookstore a criminal enterprise. The dis-
semination of presumptively protected materials constitutes part
of the criminal enterprise and thereby renders the sale of presump-
tively protected material criminal activity. The federal statute,
therefore, represents an expansion of the government regulation of
obscene materials to government regulation of both obscene and
nonobscene materials when sold by the same enterprise. Congress
has the power to criminally prohibit the dissemination of obscenity
under the Constitution.""9 The conduct criminally prohibited by
RICO substantive provisions, however, is the operation of a busi-
ness selling obscene materials when that business sells at least two
materials deemed obscene. When that enterprise is a bookstore,
selling both obscene and nonobscene materials, "a conviction for
that operation violates the First Amendment." 120 As Justice Ste-
vens aptly noted in Fort Wayne Books:
For there is a difference of constitutional dimension between an
enterprise that is engaged in the business of selling and exhibit-
ing books, magazines, and videotapes and one that is engaged in
another commercial activity, lawful or unlawful. A bookstore re-
ceiving revenue from sales of obscene books is not the same as a
hardware store or a pizza parlor funded by loan-sharking pro-
ceeds. The presumptive First Amendment protection accorded
the former does not apply either to the predicate offense or to
the business use in the latter.121
The section that follows is a necessary excursion from the
First Amendment discussion, focusing on the scope of government
regulation of speech and judicial reaction to this expansion.
117. United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1323 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 928 (1983).
118. See supra text accompanying note 105.
119. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 25-26.
120. See Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, at 14.
121. 489 U.S. 46, 84-85 (1989)(Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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IV. THE EXPANDED GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF EXPRESSIVE
MATERIALS UNDER SECTION 1962 AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
SCRUTINY OF THE EXPANDED GOVERNMENT REGULATION
In Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,2 the Supreme Court
reviewed two decisions of the Indiana courts involving the applica-
tion of that state's RICO and Civil Remedies for Racketeering Ac-
tivity (CRRA) Acts to cases involving bookstores selling allegedly
obscene materials. 12 The complaint recited thirty-nine criminal
convictions for selling obscene publications from the three
stores.' 2 ' Petitioner, Fort Wayne Books, Inc., and two other corpo-
rations, each operated an "adult bookstore" in Fort Wayne,
Indiana.
On March 19, 1984, the State of Indiana and a local prosecutor
filed a civil action against three corporations and certain of their
employees. 125 The complaint alleged that defendants had engaged
in a pattern of racketeering activity by repeatedly violating the
state laws barring the distribution of obscene books and films,
thereby violating the state's RICO law. 28 A 1984 amendment to
the state RICO law added obscenity violations to the list of predi-
cate offenses to constitute "racketeering activity" under Indiana
law. 27
Fort Wayne Books was charged with six substantive obscenity
violations and two RICO offenses. Challenging the two RICO of-
fenses, Fort Wayne Books raised no objection to the obscenity in-
dictments. 28 Rather, Fort Wayne Books advanced two arguments
122. 489 U.S. 46 (1989). Fort Wayne Books was actually a consolidation of two cases
on the intermediate and state supreme court levels: 4447 Corp. v. Goldsmith, 504 N.E.2d
559 (Ind. 1987), which originated in the Marion Circuit Court, and Fort Wayne Books, Inc.
v. State, which originated in the Allen County Court. 4447 Corporation v. Goldsmith did not
join Fort Wayne Books in seeking Supreme Court review of the Indiana Supreme Court
decision; the Supreme Court's decision focuses exclusively on the facts of the Fort Wayne
Books case.
123. Id. at 50.
124. Id. at 51.
125. Id. at 50-51.
126. Id. at 51. The "racketeering activities" forbidden by the Indiana RICO law are a
"pattern" of multiple violations of certain substantive crimes, of which distributing obscen-
ity is one. IND. CODE § 35-49-3-1 (1988). Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 57.
127. See IND. CODE § 35-45-6-1 (1988).
128. Fort Wayne Books made no claim that the Constitution bars a criminal prosecu-
tion for distributing obscene material. 489 U.S. at 54. Indeed, the Fort Wayne Books Court
noted that the constitutionality of criminal sanctions against those who distribute obscene
materials has been well established by prior cases. Id. at 54. citing, Pinkus v. United States,
436 U.S. 293, 303-304 (1978); Spawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 597-599 (1977); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-26 (1973); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441
(1957).
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attacking the facial validity of the Indiana RICO statute's use of
obscenity violations as predicate acts for a RICO conviction. First,
Fort Wayne Books argued that the Indiana RICO law, as applied
to an "enterprise" that has allegedly distributed obscene materials,
is unconstitutionally vague;1 9 and, second, that the potential pun-
ishments available under the RICO law are so severe that the stat-
ute lacks "a necessary sensitivity to First Amendment rights."'30
The Supreme Court explicitly declined, despite petitioners' re-
quest, to rule on the question of the constitutionality of the post-
judgment forfeiture authorized by the Indiana RICO/CRRA stat-
utes.""' The Court noted that since neither appealed case involved
such a forfeiture, "[tihese claims could only be reviewed when (or
if) such remedies are enforced."'' 2 The Court held that the pretrial
seizure of petitioner's bookstore and its contents was improper be-
cause there was no determination that the seized items were "ob-
scene" or that a RICO violation had occurred.133
While the constitutionality of post-judgment remedies as ap-
plied to the predicate offense of obscenity was not decided in Fort
Wayne Books, it was presented and decided in United States v.
Pryba.'13 The Prybas owned and operated nine video rental stores
and three bookstores in Northern Virginia. Following a jury trial,
the Prybas were convicted of various offenses relating to the sale of
obscene videotapes and obscene magazines. 3 5 The Prybas ap-
129. Petitioner argued that the "inherent vagueness" of the standard established by
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), is at the root of his objection to any RICO prosecu-
tion based on predicate acts of obscenity. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 87-614, at 24-33.
130. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 870614, at 23.
131. Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 60.
132. Id. Justice Stevens, in a separate opinion joined by Justice Brennan and Justice
Marshall, dissented from the Court's opinion in the Sappenfield case and concurred in part
and dissented in part from the Court's Fort Wayne Books decision. Justice Stevens argued
that the questions relating to the severity of the post-judgment forfeiture remedies were
ripe for review. "The significance of making obscenity a predicate offense comparable to
murder, kidnapping, extortion, or arson cannot be evaluated fairly if the CRRA portion of
the RICO/CRRA scheme is ignored." Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 63. The Court stated that mere probable cause to believe that a violation
had transpired is inadequate to remove books or films from circulation. Id. at 66. "Where
the claimed RICO violation is a pattern of racketeering that can be established only by
rebutting the presumption that expressive materials are protected by the First Amendment,
that presumption is not rebutted until the claimed justification for seizing such materials is
properly established in an adversary proceeding." Id. at 67.
134. 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct 305 (1990).
135. Dennis E. Pryba and Barbara A. Pryba, husband and wife, were each convicted of
one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (participating in a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity); one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (employed by a criminal enterprise engaged in
racketeering activities); one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)(conspiracy to violate §
1962(a)); seven counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (transportation of obscene materials in
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pealed their conviction and raised constitutional challenges to the
forfeiture provisions of the federal RICO statute.136 The heart of
the government's case consisted of the introduction of the tapes
and magazines that were alleged to be obscene.1 3 7 At trial, the jury
found six of the nine magazines and four video tapes that had been
rented or purchased to be obscene.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that the forfeiture provision of the federal RICO statute was
constitutional. 38 The court reasoned that the provision did not act
as a prior restraint on free speech because the defendants had an
opportunity to litigate the issue of whether the speech was obscene
prior to the forfeiture. The court, deciding that the materials were
obscene, seized the materials as a subsequent punishment for the
defendant's criminal conduct. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 3 '
Constitutional attacks on the application of obscenity predi-
cates to enterprises engaging in the sale of both obscene and non-
obscene presumptively protected material have focused on the
penalties imposed for criminal conduct under the federal RICO
statute. Appellate courts have relied upon Fort Wayne Books and
Pryba to summarily dismiss these challenges. By contrast, this
Comment. argues that it is the substantive offense under section
1962 of the statute, and not the penalties imposed under section
1963, that pose constitutional problems. This argument was re-
cently presented to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in United States v. Alexander 40
V. UNITED STATES V. ALEXANDER
A. Factual History
In United States v. Alexander, the petitioner, Ferris J. Alex-
interstate commerce for sale and distribution). Jennifer G. Williams was acquitted on Count
I, violation of § 1962(a), but convicted of all of the remaining counts. Educational Books,
Inc. was convicted of one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) and one count of violating
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). All defendants appealed their judgments. Pryba, 900 F.2d at 750.
136. The Prybas also raised issues concerning the use of the prior state obscenity con-
victions of Educational Books, Inc. to prove predicate acts of racketeering, and various rul-
ings the trial court made in the admission of evidence and in the voir dire examination of
prospective jurors. Pryba, 900 F.2d at 750.
137. The indictments were brought following an obscenity investigation during which
investigators opened memberships with video retail centers and rented or purchased sexu-
ally explicit video tapes and magazines. Id. at 750.
138. Id. at 755-56.
139. 111 S.Ct. 305 (1990).
140. 943 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1991).
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ander, Sr., was convicted on twenty-four counts of a forty-one
count indictment, including the sale of obscene magazines and
videos, and operating an enterprise selling obscene materials in vi-
olation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.1'4 Alexander was in the adult en-
tertainment business for more than thirty years, selling magazines,
showing movies, and selling and renting video cassettes. 142 Alexan-
der's business, which the government charged was a RICO "enter-
prise," consisted of thirteen rental stores and one wholesale dis-
tributorship, selling millions of dollars of these materials each
year.143 Of all this material, the jury found four magazines and
three videotapes sold by his business to be obscene.'44 The sale of
these seven obscene materials constituted the predicate acts on
which Alexander's RICO convictions were based.' 45
The court sentenced Alexander to six years imprisonment for
the RICO violations, imposed a fine of 100,000 dollars, and ordered
Alexander to pay the costs of his prosecution, incarceration, and
supervised release.' 46 The court also ordered forfeiture of Alexan-
der's interest in his thirteen retail stores and one wholesale distrib-
utorship, and forfeiture of 8.9 million dollars in proceeds generated
by those businesses during the years 1985 through 1988.' 7
Alexander appealed his conviction and sentence to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, challenging the
constitutional validity, both facially and as applied, of the statutes
on which his obscenity-related convictions and penalties were
based. The three-judge panel rejected Alexander's constitutional
arguments and the appeal of his conviction for the other counts of
his indictment. Alexander petitioned the court for rehearing en
banc of the one issue he claimed was erroneously decided in part
IV of the court's opinion, wherein the court rejected Alexander's
argument that the First Amendment prohibits criminal prosecu-
tion and conviction for the operation of a business selling both ob-
141. Id. at 826-27. Alexander sought: 1) a declaratory judgment that the application of
the RICO statute to obscenity offenses violated his First Amendment rights, and 2) a per-
manent injunction prohibiting the application of the RICO statute to obscenity offenses.
The district court granted the Attorney General's motion to dismiss and motion for sum-
mary judgment. Alexander v. Thornburgh, 713 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Minn.), appeal dismissed,
881 F. 2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1989).
142. Alexander, 943 F.2d at 827.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 829.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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scene and nonobscene expressive materials.14 Without further ex-
planation, the court stated: "Alexander was not prosecuted for
selling nonobscene material . "...149 Recently, the United States
Supreme Court granted petitioner Alexander's request for a writ of
certiorari. 5 ° On January 12, 1993, the Court heard oral argu-
ments. 15' The Court certified two questions: first, whether the for-
feiture provision under section 1963 constitutes a prior restraint or
otherwise violates the First Amendment, and second, whether the
forfeiture provision is so disproportionate to the offense as to con-
stitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 52 It has been sug-
gested that during oral argument the court concentrated on the
question of First Amendment considerations rather than the
Eighth Amendment. 53 Although the question that was certified
considered the constitutionality of section 1963 under the First
Amendment rather than section 1962, there is no analytical dis-
tinction between the two. The government's actions are content
based, thus invalidating the seizure of constitutionally protected
materials.
B. Eighth Circuit's Opinion
Alexander's First Amendment arguments cannot be under-
stood without first understanding the conduct criminally prohib-
ited by RICO substantive provisions under section 1962(c), the
punishment for that conduct under section 1963, and the prohibi-
tions of the First Amendment.
The court's opinion suggests that Alexander's section 1962(c)
offense consisted of merely selling obscene materials. 54 While the
sale of obscene materials were the predicate offenses charged, the
substantive 1962(c) offense was operating a business which sold
seven obscene magazines and videotapes. Because the business, or
"enterprise" Alexander was accused of operating, also sold millions
of dollars of expressive materials not proved obscene, Alexander
148. See Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, at 2.
149. Alexander, 943 F.2d at 834.
150. Alexander, 112 S. Ct. 3024 (1992).
151. Tony Mauro, Court Ponders Case of Prosecutorial Zeal, Jan. 18, 1993, LEGAL
TIMEs at 8.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. The court stated: "We summarily reject Alexander's arguments. The district
courts did not err in rejecting Alexander's invitation to overturn Miller." Id. at 832. While
the court aptly relies on Pryba in support of its contention that "forfeiture provided by 18
U.S.C. § 1467 does not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 833, this does not end the
inquiry.
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argued that he was, in effect, "convicted for selling both obscene
and nonobscene expressive materials.'
1 55
On appeal, the government did not dispute this description of
the conduct criminally prohibited by RICO section 1962(c), and
the court did not otherwise refer to the prohibited conduct.'56 The
court's opinion, however, strongly suggests that it confused the
substantive offense prohibited by RICO section 1962(c) with the
punishment imposed by the forfeiture provisions of section 1963.
RICO section 1963 mandates forfeiture of all assets used or
invested in a RICO enterprise. 57 The forfeiture provisions are pen-
alties for violating RICO section 1962. These penalties cannot be
imposed unless and until a defendant has been convicted of a sec-
tion 1962 violation.' 58 The court in Alexander characterized this
constitutional attack on his conviction for violating section 1962 as
an attack on RICO's forfeiture provisions. "Alexander argues that
the application of the forfeiture provision of section 1962 unconsti-
tutionally criminalizes non-obscene expressive material."' 59
The Alexander court misconstrued the provisions of the RICO
statute. Section 1962 contains no forfeiture provision; the forfei-
ture provisions are contained in section 1963. "[T]he First Amend-
ment, regardless of the punishment imposed, limits prosecution
for the sale of sexually explicit expressive materials to the sale of
obscene materials only under the Supreme Court's holding in
Miller.60
The Eighth Circuit's reference to the "forfeiture provision of
section 1962," was later applied to Alexander's constitutional argu-
ment: "Alexander asserts that Sable Communication v. Federal
Communications Commission, . . . further supports his argument
that the application of the RICO forfeiture provision unconstitu-
tionally criminalized the sale of expressive material."''
The FCC statute in Sable contained no forfeiture provisions.
The court's opinion implies that committing the predicate act con-
stitutes the RICO offense and the prohibition against operating the
business was merely punishment for the offense, and not the RICO
155. See Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, at 5.
156. The court did not describe the conduct prohibited by RICO section 1962(c) ex-
cept to summarize the statutory language in a footnote. See Alexander's Petition for Re-
hearing, at 5.
157. Section 1963(a)(3).
158. See Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, at 7.
159. Alexander, 943 F.2d at 832.
160. See Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, at 7 (emphasis in original).
161. Alexander at 833-34. For a discussion of the Sable decision, see supra text ac-
companying notes 112-16.
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offense itself. Separation of the RICO offense set out in section
1962 (operating the business) from the RICO punishment power
set out in section 1963 (forfeiture provision) is fundamental to an
understanding of the First Amendment concerns presented by sec-
tion 1962(c). 162 Adhering to this principle, the court's application
of the holding in Pryba seems misplaced. The criminal defendants
in Pryba challenged section 1962 only on grounds of vagueness,
and attacked the RICO forfeiture provision, facially and as ap-
plied, on grounds of overbreadth and prior restraint. 63
The court's rejection of the Supreme Court's holding in Sable,
apparently failing to separate the substantive crime under section
1962 from the penalties imposed under section 1963, suggests a be-
lief that had the separate bans on obscene and nonobscene phone
messages been combined to ban purveyors who sold both obscene
and nonobscene messages, the Court would have upheld the stat-
ute.' 4 The Supreme Court has stated that business purveying sex-
ually explicit speech has First Amendment protection. 6 5
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has considered the ques-
tion of whether a city ordinance allowing revocation of the license
of any bookseller or movie house possessing or exhibiting both ob-
scene and nonobscene materials violated the First Amendment. In
Paducah v. Investment Entertainment, Inc.,' the court invali-
dated such an ordinance on First Amendment grounds, holding
that the ordinance's license revocation procedure was invalid be-
cause it could result in closing a place of business even though not
all the materials were obscene. The revocation procedure, the court
concluded, constituted a prior restraint of both protected and un-
protected speech. 67
The Paducah court held that the procedural safeguards con-
cerning the obscene materials were adequate because the license
revocation procedures were not triggered until after a procedural
determination that the material sold was obscene. The license rev-
ocation order, however, violated the First Amendment because the
license revocation also restrained nonobscene materials without
162. See Alexander's Reply Brief, at 10.
163. United States v. Pryba, 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 305
(1990). See also supra text accompanying notes 133-37.
164. See Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, at 9.
165. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
166. 791 F.2d 463 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986).
167. 791 F.2d at 465. The appellate court cited approvingly an example given by the
district court: "Under the ordinance a movie theater could be closed for repeatedly showing
an obscene film on weekends even though the theater showed 'The Ten Commandments,'
'Snow White,' and 'Gone With the Wind' on week days." Id.
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proof that they were obscene.6 5 The Eighth Circuit did not ad-
dress Alexander's constitutional, challenge to RICO section 1962(c)
using obscenity predicates. Whether this section withstands First
Amendment scrutiny, therefore, remains unanswered.
VI. CONCLUSION
Alexander's constitutional challenge to RICO section 1962(c)
violations using obscenity predicates is an attack on the statute as
applied to an "enterprise" engaged in the sale of presumptively
protected materials. The Alexander argument echoes the constitu-
tional problems alluded to in Justice O'Connor's concurring opin-
ion in Arcara.6 9 Justice O'Connor's metaphorical bookstore, Alex-
ander argues, differs from a hardware store funded by loan
sharking proceeds, or a pizza parlor used as a place for prostitu-
tion. Like the solicitation of prostitution, the activity in the above
hypothetical manifests absolutely no element of protected
expression.'7
The significance of the Alexander decision, therefore, emerges
against the backdrop of O'Connor's metaphorical bookstore. RICO
Section 1962(c), by rendering a bookstore that has sold at least two
obscene materials a criminal enterprise, prohibits the future sale of
presumptively protected materials. According to O'Connor, the
case of a bookstore selling obscene material "clearly implicates
First Amendment concerns and requires an analysis under the ap-
propriate First Amendment standard of review."' 71
In Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, he stated: "Alexander
makes no argument that the sale of obscene materials has First
Amendment protection. The corollary, however, is that the sale of
non-obscene material is protected even when sold at the same store
at which obscene material is sold.' 72 The gravity of the constitu-
tional question presented in part IV of the Alexander opinion is
best illustrated by Justice Brennan's dissent in Maryland v.
Macon:'73
[T]he same official use of the power to search and seize [expres-
sive material] sanctioned today in its application against the
168. Id. at 470.
169. 478 U.S. 697 (1986). See also supra text accompanying notes 108-110.
170. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 708 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See
supra text accompanying notes 108-110.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 105.,
172. Alexander's Petition for Rehearing, at 10.
173. 472 U.S. 463 (1985)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sexual nonconformist can be instantly turned against the politi-
cal nonconformist . ... These 'stealthy encroachments' upon
our liberties sanctioned in the State's present effort to combat
vice may become potent weapons in a future effort to shackle
political dissenters and stifle their voices. 174
If Alexander is appealed to the Supreme Court, a proper anal-
ysis of RICO section 1962(c) using obscenity predicates may ensure
the continued protections of the freedom of speech and press guar-
antees under the First Amendment. If the Supreme Court fails to
untangle the substantive RICO offense under section 1962(c) from
the penalties imposed under section 1963, however, the govern-
ment's "effort to combat vice '175 may reduce these voices of free-
dom to distant echoes of a lost era.
Amanda M. McGovern176
174. Id. at 477.
175. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 144.
176. J.D., 1992, University of Miami School of Law.
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